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ALatent Variable Jde1ofQuality Determination
ABSTRCT
Despite substantial interest in the determination of quality, there has
been little empirical work in the area. The problem, of course, is the
general lack of data on quality. This paper overcomes the data problem by
constructing a Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause (MIMIC) model of quality
determination. We present a one—factor MIMIC model of quality which derives
natural indicators out of the relationship between input demand and output
determination. The indicators turn out to be input demands which have been
filtered to remove variation due to all factors, except quality ana random
disturbances. These indicators are measures of input investment in each unit
of output or the volume (intensity) of service. The model is identified by
defining input demand to be a function of quantity and "total effective
output (quantity times average quality), instead of of quantity and average
quality. The mode) is then applied to the determination of nursing home
quality. The model appears to perform quite well, as the results generally
conform with economic theory and restrictions implied by the MIMIC structure
are accepted in hypothesis tests.
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StateUniversity of New York
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DSnT.estantialinterest in the determination of quality, there has
been little empirical work in the area.1 The problem, of course, is the
general lack of oata on quality. Quality Is usually defined as characteristics
of goods other than the physical units in which they are sold.2 For example,
autorcoiles are sold on a per car basis with qutlity characteristics being
durability, miles per gallon of gasoline, comfort of ride, etc. Data on these
characteristics can be hard to come by.
This paper overcomes the data problem by constructing a Multiple
Indicator Multiple Cause (MIMIC) model of quality determination.3 The
difficulties in implementing the MIMIC model are (1) to find valid indicators
of the latent variable (quality), and (ii) to identify the mcdel. We present a
one—factor MIMIC model of quality which derives natural indicators out of the
relation3hip between input demand and output determination. The indicators
turn out to be input demands which have been filtered to remove variation due
to all factors, except quality and random aisturbances, These indicators are
measures of input investment in each unit of output or the volume (intensity)
of service. Te model is identified by defining input demand to be a functicn
of quantity and 'total effective output" (which is quantity times average
quality), instead of of quantity and average quality.
This structure is then used to estimate a model of the determination of
nursing home quality. It is estimated with a minimum distance procedure
proposed in Chamberlain (1982) for the purpose of estimating panel data
models. The model appears to perform quite well, as the results generally
conform with economic theory and restrictions implied by the MIMIC structure
are accepted in hypothesis tests.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we briefly present the
MIMIC structure. n section III, we derive the indicators of quality, and
Identify the model. in section IV,wediscuss estimation. In section V, we
specify and estimate a model of the determination of nursing home quality.
Finally, conclusions are drawn In section VI.2
II. THE MiMIC MODEL
The MIMIC model is concerned with estimating an eauation of the form
(1) 01 = + +
where0 Is the latent variable, and the Xjj's are causes of Q. Although O
is not observed, indicators of O are and are related to via a measurement
model of the form
(2) V1 = +
whereV1 is the vector of indicators, and Is a vector of measurement
errors. By stbstituting (1) into (2) for 01, we derive a model which is no
longer a function of the latent variable 01. That model Is a system of
equations whose right hand sides are restricted to be proportional to one
another. These proportionality restrictions constrain the structure to be a
one—factor model of the latent variable, and, in addition to a normalization,
Identify the parameters in (I) and (2).
III. A MIMIC MODEL OF OUALITY DETERMINATION
The problem is to estimate a reduced form model of quality determination.
Let Qi be an index of the average quality of goods produced by firm 1. Then,




where the Zjj'S are exogenous demand variables, theWjj's are exogenous supply
variables, the $jj.'S are unknown parameters, and the are Independently
distributed random disturbances with zero mean. Since quality Is not directly
observed, the coefficients of (1) cannot be directly estimated. Instead, we
exploit the theoretical relationship between Input demand and output
determination to indirectly Identify and estimate these coefficients.
The arguments of a cost function and the corresponding conditional input
demand functions are outputs, input prices, and in the shortrun, capital
stock. A firms output depends on the quantity and quality of goodsproduced.3
Let us define a firm's total Heffective output as quantity times quality.4
The cost of production, and corresponding conditional Input demands may depend
upon the quantity—quality mix as well as total effective" output. Let be
firm l's total "effective' output, and be the physical number of units
produced. Then, assuming a quadratic cost function, firm i's conditional input
demand functions are
(4) = + + + +(=
wherethe a's are unknown coefficients, and the v1'sareindependently
distributed random disturbances with mean zero.
Since a firm's total "effective" output can be measured as quantity times
quaHty, can be expressed as
=
X101
Substitution of (3) into (5) yields the reduced form total 'effective" output
equation:
+ + =1J+kW1kXi+






(8) q12 = a12X1e1 + v12,
(9) = forall 2 and j.4
With the imposition of several restrictions on the reduced form input
demand functIons (7) the coefficients in the reduced form quality equation (3)
and in the structural input demand functions (4) can be Identified. The first
restriction Is a normalization to provide quality with a unit of measurement.
As of now, It is measured in arbitrary units. If we divide quality by the
coefficient on quality in one of the input demand equations, then quality is
measured in the same units as that input. This is equivalent to restricting
one of the a0's to unity. In addition, there are the cross equation
restrictions implied by (9), which require the reduced form input demand
functions (7) to be proportional to one another in the exogenous variables
that determine total 'effective'1 output in (6).
This model can be Interpreted as a MIMIC model. The normalization and
proportionality restrictions are similar to the restrictions that arise in
one—factor MIMIC models. The normalization bases quality, the latent variable,
to the same scale as one of the indicators, and the proportionality
constraints restrict the measurement mode) to be a one—factor mode) of
quality. The indicators are input demands which have been filtered to remove
variation due to quantity, input prices, and capital stock. The remaining
variation in the filtered input demands is due to quality and random
disturbances. The causes are the right hand side variables In (6).
The estimates can be used to predict quality scores for each firm, which
are Indicies of Input quantities normaflzed to account for differences in
quantity, input prices, and capital stock. Therefore, they measure the input
investment in each unit of output or the volume (intensity) of service.
IV. ESTIMATION
Instead of maximum likelihood, the method usually used to estimate MIMIC
models, the coefficients In the reduced form quality equation (3) and In the
structural input demand functions (4) are estimated using a minimum distance
procedure described In Chambera1n (1982). This involves estimating the
reduced forir Input demand equations (7) subject to the normalization and
proportionality restrictions (9)•6 Chamberlain develops this procedure for
panel data models, but it is appropriate for estimating any multivarlate model
subject to non—linear cross equation restrictions. The advantages of this
procedure are: (I) normally distributed disturbances are not required, (ii)
genera) heteroskedaticity is taken into account, (iii) the estimates are fully
eficient, and (iv) computational ease. In addition, he derives statistics
for hypothesis testing.5
V. THE DETERMINATION OF N&JRSIN6 HOMEQUALITYOF CARE
A.. Nursing Home Quality
Nursing homes provide their patients with a package of goods and services
such as medical care, room and board, and social services. Therefore, a
nursing home's quality Is utility patients derive from consuming its package
of goods and services. A home can improve its quality by adjusting the
composition of Its package so as to be more in accordance with patients'
preferences or by Increasing the quantity of any commodity. Therefore, if
patients prefer nursing services to social activities, the home can improve
its quality without raising its operating costs by shifting resources from
from social activities to nursing services. The more patients are willing to
pay for a particular component and the lower its marginal cost, the greater
the equilibrium quantity of that component. If there Is an exogenous increase
in demand, then the home invests In those components that yield the greatest
marginal profit. Therefore, holding Input prices constant, increases in
service intensity raise patient utility. Since quality is the utility patients
derive from consuming a nursing home's package, observed increases In a home's
service intensity are tantamount to increases in quality.
B. Data
The model is estimated with data constructed from New York State's 1980
survey of Long Term Care Facilities.7 The sample consists of 455 nursing
homes, of which 288 are proprietary and 167 are "not for profit" institutions.
Unless otherwise specIfIed, the varIables are daIly averages, with the home as
the unit of observation. Descriptive statistics are presented in table 1.
The dependent variables in the input demand equations are IOU'S nursing
labor hours, 100's of other labor hours, and a supplies quantity index. The
exogenous supply variables are the input prices and capital stock. The input
prices are the hourly nursing wage rate, the hourly other labor wage rate, and
a supplies price index. Since, the majority of capital owned by a nursing home
is the facility Itself, capital stock measured as the area of the facility in
1O0O0O's of square feet.
The exogenous demand variables are the per capita income of the people
living in the nursing home's market area, the population over age 65 in the
nursing home's market area, the proportion of patients In the nursing home
whose last residence before entering the nursing home was located in the same6
county in which the nursing home is located, and an index of health status of
the patients In the nursing home. Income is measured in 1000's of dollars, and
population in 10,000's of people. The proportion of patients from the same
county is a measure of the distance of the nursing home from the family and
friends of its patients. Presumably, nursing homes that are located closer to
its patients' family and friends are more attractive, ceteris paribus. The
health index Is really an index of ill—health.
In addition to the exogenous demand and supply variables, we must
consider the instruments of government regulation. The two major forms of
regulation in the nursing home Industry are the Medicaid patient subsidy
program and the Certificate of Need (CON) cost containtment program.8
Medicaid is an entitlement program established under the Social Security
Act to provide the poor with a minimum floor of health services. Through
direct subsidies, the Medicaid program makes health care available to
individuals wro otherwise could not afford It. The Medicaid program reimburses
nursing homes for the care of Medicaid eligible patients. Typically, the
reimbursements are determined by a "cost plus" method, where the reimbursement
per patient is equal to average operating costs plus some return referred to
as the Medicaid "plus" factor.
The CON cost containment program requires that, in order to expand an
existing nursing home or build a new one, the government must certify that the
proposed facility is indeed "needed". Effectively, CON limits the capacity of
existing nursing homes and new entry into the market. It was thought that
costs could be contained by limiting the available supply of nursing home
beds.
Therefore, the policy variables are the Medicaid plus factor, the CON
capacity constraint, and the concentration of the home's market area. Since
the CON capacity constraint Is binding, it is measured as theaverage daily
census of patients In the home, and CON entry policy is captured by a
Herfindahi index of the concentration of each home's market.9 Entry reduces
the concentration of a home's market.
C. Results
Due to the CON capacity constraint It was necessary to Impose one
additional restriction on the model. The CON capacity constraint implies that
quantity Is exogenous, and therefore, a determinant of quality. Consequently,7
In order to Identify the intercept of the reduced form quality equation, we
excluded from one of the input demand functions. This assumption places an
Implicit restriction on the underlying technology of nursing home production.
It requires one of the input demands to depend only on total "effective"
output, and not on the quantity—quality mix. Since linear input demand
is consistent with a quadratic cost function, this restriction requires one of
the second order coefficients on an input price times to be zero.
The model was estimated separately for proprietary and "not for profit"
institutions as hypothesis tests rejected pooling.10 The estimated coefficients
and corresponding t—statistlcs for the reduced form quality equations are
presented in table 2, and for the input demand equations in table 3.
The estimates appear to be quite reasonable. There is a substantial
amount of precision in the estimates, and hypothesis tests to determine If the
normalization, proportionality, and exclusion restrictions are valid were
accepted. Specifically, the test statistics are 20.08 for the proprietary
sample, 16.68 for the "not for profit" sample, and are both distributed
X2(27). The corresponding critical value at the .05 signifIcance level is
40 .11.
In addition, the estimates generally conform with economic theory. In the
quality equations, the coefficients on input price variables have negative
signs when they are significantly different from zero, and the coefficients on
capital stock are positive and ignlficant, suggesting that quality is easier
to produce the bigger the facility, certerus paribis. Also, the coefficients
on the Ill-health Index, Income, and percent of patIents form the same county
are positive and significantly different from zero, suggesting that increases
in demand lead to higher quality. On the other hand, the coefficient on
population Is negative and significant in the proprietary model.
The policy variables In the quality equations also perform as expected.
The coefficients on the Medicaid plus factor are negative and significantly
different from zero. In addition, the coefficient on the concentration index
in the proprietary sample Is negative and significant, suggesting that
reductions in competition lower quality. Finally, the coefficients on the
total number of patients are negative, suggesting that the marginal cost of
quality increases as the number of patients increase.
Finally, the input demand equations also look quite reasonable. The
coefficients on quantity and quality are positive and generally significant,
and the coefficients on own price are generally negative and significant.8
V.CONCLUSIONS
Theempirical Investigation of the determinants of quality Is usually
hampered by a lack of data on quality itself. To solve this problem, we have
developed a MIMIC mood which allows us to indirectly estimate the
coefficients of a reduced form quality equation. The approach is to
simultaneously estimate a reduced form model of quality and input demand
functions. The indicators of quality turn out to be input demands which have
been filtered to remove variation due all factors except quality and random
disturbances, These indicators are measures of the input investment in each
unit of physical output. Identification is achieved by defining input demand
to be a function of quantity ar.d "total effective output", instead of of
quantity and average quality. The model was successfully applied to a nursing
home data set, as the results generally conform with economic theory and
restrictions implied by the MIMIC structure are accepted by hypothesis tests.9
FOOTNOTES
See Leffler (1982) fore a good discussion of the theoretcal quality
literature through 1982, and Allen (1984) thereafter. The major source of
empirical work has been through the Hedonic pricing literature spurred by
Rosen (1974). This Literature requires the assumption of perfectly competitive
markets, and In practice is more concerned with how quality characteristics
affect the competitive price, than the factors that determine the quality
choi ces.
2 See Lancaster(1966), and more recently Leffler (1982), for more on the
definition of quality.
See Goldberger (1972a), Joreskog and Goldberger (1975), and Robinson (1974)
for discussions of MIMIC models, and Aigner et. al. (1984) for a general
survey of latent variable models.
This notion of total "effective' output is used in Spady and Friedlander
(1978) and in Leffler (1982). It is a quality constant measure of output, and,
as Spady and Friedlander point out, Is consistant with aggregation theory.
See Goldbcrger (1972b), Joreskog and Goldberger (1975), and Joreskog and
Sorbom (1981) for Maximum—Likelihood approachs.
6 Inmany cases (other than regulated industries), quantity may be endogenous.
This wouold require the additional specification of a reduced form quantity
equation along the lines of (3). In this case, the model would be estimated by
Instrumental variables. Chamberlain (1982) also considers these cases.
See Gertler (1985b) for a more detailed description of the data.
8 See Gertler (1985a) and(1985b) for a detailed analysis of the effects of
these regulation on the nursing home industry.
See Gertler (1985a) for more on the measursement of the CON capacity
constraint.
10 The test forpooling proprietary and "not for profit" homes in the same
model is preformed under the maintained hypothesis that the proportionality,
normalization, and exclusion restrictions are valid. The test statistic is
99.74, and is distributed X2(27). The corresponding critical value at the .05
significance level is 40.11.
This point is discussed in detail in Gertler (1985a). Briefly, nursing
homes face two types of demand: (1) "private pay" patient demand, which is
sensitive to price and quality choices, and (ii) Medicaid demand, which is
perfectly elastic at the Medicaid reimbursement rate. Therefore, nursing homes
can price discriminate between patients who finance their care privately and
patients whose care is financed by Medicaid, but are required to provide the
same quality to both types of patients. An increase in the Medicaid "plus"
factor raises the marginal profit of a Medicaid patient. Therefore, homes have
incentive to substitute Medicaid patients for "private pay" patients. Homes
reduce "private pay" demand and operating costs by lowering quality.10
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TABLE I
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
VARIABLE ALL HOMES PROPRIETARYNOT FOR PROFIT
1. Nursing labor 315.09 313.20 318.36
Hours (266.21) (224.27) (327.01)
2. Other Labor 216.18 189.62 261.99
Hours (116.39) (125.88) (233.15)
3. Supplies Quantity 2.50 2.60 2.32
Index (2.04) (2.18) (1.78)
4.Nursing Hourly 7.82 7.67 8.06
Wage (2.75) (2.84) (2.59)
5. Other labor 8.78 7.97 8.79
Hourly Wage (2.78) (2.44) (3.23)
6. SupplIes 1.41 1.38 1.44
Price ( .10) ( .03) ( .15)
7. Capital 6.86 7.04 6,54
Stock (25.51) (31.77) (5.84)
8. Per Capita 7.15 7.08 7.27
Income (1.40) (1.44) (1.32)
9. PopulatIon 1.07 .98 1.23
Over 65 ( .88) ( .87) ( .87)
10. X Patients .74 .77 .70
Same County ( .26) ( .24) ( .30)
11. Health 1.43 1.51 1.31
Status Index C .61) C .57) ( .67)
12. MedIcaid Plus 15.41 18.35 10.34
Factor (15.21) (13.96) (15.96)
13. Total 124.21 124.61 124.01
Patients C 94.04) C 89.33) (101.94)
14. Market .12 .12 .11
Concentration ( .11) ( .12) C .09)
15. # of Observations 455 288 16712
TABLE 2
REDUCED FORM QUALITY EQUATIONS
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS AND 1—STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES
INDEPENDENT PROPRIETARY "NOT FOR PROFIT"
VARIABLE HOMES HOMES
1. CONSTANT .51 .21
.36) C.26)
2. TOTAL # OF —.08 —.14
PATIENTS C 1.52) ( 1.14)
3. NURSING HOURLY —.14 .06
WAGE C 3.03) (.81)
4. OTHER LABOR'S .04 —.18
HOURLY WAGE C.86) ( 2.98)
5. SUPPLIES .58 .69
PRICE C.56) C 1.38)
6. CAPITAL .02 .04
STOCK C 1.70) ( 1.88)
7. HEALTH 1.27 1.62
STATUS (29.98) (23.30)
8. INCOME .04 .06
3.00) C 1.96)
9. POPULATION —.04 —.05
( 4.01) C.66)
10. MEDICAID PLUS —.01 —.01
FACTOR C 2.11) ( 2.13)
11. X PATIENTS .19 .29
SAME COUNTY C 2.21) C 2.05)
12. MARKET —1.18 .14
CONCENTRATION ( 4.12) C.21)13
TABLE 3
PROPRIETARY INPUT DEMAND EQUATIONS
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE NURSING HOURS OTHER LABOR HOURS SUPPLIES
1. CONSTANT 3.39 —2.92 16.38
1.37) ( 2.78) ( 6.12)
2. TOTAL QUALITY 1.00* .24 .04
(12.41) (.75)
3. TOTAL # OF .86 2.04
PATIENTS (16.38) (12.76)
4. NURSING HOURLY .02 .00 .14
WAGE (.44) (.31) C 2.90)
5. OTHER LABOR'S —.05 —.10 —.11
HOURLY WAGE (.91) ( 3.95) C 1.92)
6. SUPPLIES —2.20 —12.01
PRICE ( 1.22) ( 3.45) C 6.14)
7. CAPITAL —.03 —.04 —.00
STOCK ( 1.72) C 9.47) C.60)
"NOT FOR PROFIT" INPUT DEMAND EQUATIONS
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE NURSING HOURS OTHER LABOR HOURS SUPPLIES
1. CONSTANT .21 —1.85 6.61
.26) C 2.87) ( 9.46)
2. TOTAL QUALITY 1.00* .26 .08
7.77) C 2.00)
3. TOTAL # OF 1.21 1,62
PATIENTS ( 7.61) ( 8.89)
4. NURSING HOURLY —.17 .07 .01
WAGE ( 2.75) C 1.92) C.21)
5. OTHER LABOR'S .18 -.06 .07
HOURLY WAGE ( 2.99) C 1.86) C 1.89)
6. SUPPLIES —.83 —.04 —4.91
PRICE C 1.08) ( 2.76) ( 9.08)
1. CAPITAL .00 .03 —.01
STOCK C.08) C 1.19) (.48)
*Coefficientrestricted to unity.
**Coefficientrestricted to zero.